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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal from the district court's judgment in favor of 
Appellee Debbie Mitchell in her complaint brought under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. S 1346, 
requires us to decide whether the National Park Service's 
choice not to repair or improve a drainage ditch and 
concrete head-wall located five feet west of a paved roadway 
came within the discretionary function exception to the Act 
so as to immunize the Service from Mitchell's suit brought 
after she collided with a head-wall at the end of a drainage 
ditch. 
 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States 
waives sovereign immunity for torts involving "personal 
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. 
S 1346(b). The FTCA carves out an exception to 
governmental liability and provides: 
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       The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to-- 
 
       (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an 
       employee of the Government . . . based upon the 
       exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
       perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of 
       a federal agency or an employee of the Government . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2680. 
 
The United States contends on appeal that the National 
Park Service's decision not to repair or improve the 
drainage ditch and head-wall was a legitimate exercise of 
governmental discretion and thus not actionable under the 
FTCA. We agree with the government and will reverse. 
 
The district court had federal question jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2671. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction over the final decision of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The United States filed a 
timely notice of appeal under Rule 4(a), Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This court exercises plenary review 
over the applicability of the discretionary function 
exception. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
United States, 837 F.2d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
I. 
 
The National Park Service, a bureau within the 
Department of the Interior, manages the nation's parks and 
recreational areas, including the Delaware Water Gap 
National Recreation Area, a unit of the National Park 
Service. Highway Route 209 runs through the Recreation 
Area and was designed, built and maintained by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In 1983, the 
Commonwealth ceded State Route 209 to the United States 
as part of the Recreation Area. 
 
Since the time the roadway was received from 
Pennsylvania, the Park Service has adopted a policy aimed 
at converting it from a commercial through-road to one 
used in connection with the Recreation Area itself. To this 
end, Congress enacted legislation closing the road to non- 
local commercial traffic and provided funding for the 
construction of a bypass in New Jersey, which was 
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explicitly intended as an alternative to Route 209. In 1996, 
Congress provided that all commercial traffic not connected 
with the Recreation Area itself will be barred from Route 
209 as of September 30, 2005. 
 
Since 1983 the Park Service has performed necessary 
maintenance on the road. Because of the condition of the 
road as received from the Commonwealth, however, the 
Park Service has not had sufficient appropriations for a 
complete reconstruction, which has resulted in the Service 
setting priorities among work items. The Service conducted 
an engineering study of the roads in the Recreation Area in 
1986 that identified numerous bridges that were in need of 
reconstruction because of structural deficiencies, 
insufficient width and low load limits, and reported that 
"most of the paved roads in the Recreation Area are in need 
of an overlay in a minimum of ten years." App. at 154. The 
study recognized also that "[c]oncrete posts, telephone 
poles, culvert head-walls, and trees within the clear zone 
. . . may constitute a safety hazard." Id.  Such 
encroachments existed "on nearly all road sections in the 
Park." Id. Because of the massive repairs needed, the 
Service was forced to determine priorities and repair the 
most urgent problems first. From 1989 to 1993 no 
accidents, other than Mitchell's, were attributed to the 
Eshback area of Route 209, and a 1992 traffic safety report 
did not cite this stretch of roadway as a high hazard area. 
See App. at 65. 
 
On July 27, 1993 at approximately 7:30 p.m., Appellee 
Debbie Mitchell was driving her 1989 GMC pick-up 
northbound on Route 209 within the Delaware Water Gap 
National Recreation Area. The road is a two-lane asphalt 
road which has a posted speed limit of 45 MPH. Attempting 
to avoid an oncoming vehicle she believed was improperly 
in her travel lane, she swerved to the right, drove off the 
road, which had a 4-5 inch drop-off, and entered a grassy 
area which sloped slightly to the right. The grassy area was 
approximately 40-50 feet wide and constituted a"clear 
zone" in which she traveled in excess of 300 feet, at which 
point she turned to the left to re-enter the road at a speed 
"no greater than 45 MPH." App. at 22. Mitchell over- 
corrected, crossed over the northbound travel lane and the 
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southbound lane, drove off the paved roadway, entered a 
drainage ditch and struck a concrete head-wall of a culvert 
on the north end of the ditch. The head-wall, culvert and 
ditch were all approximately five feet from the near edge of 
paved road. Mitchell was seriously injured. 
 
The district court entered final judgment in Mitchell's 
favor, holding that the discretionary exception did not apply 
to the Service's acts and that Mitchell did not negligently 
operate her automobile. The United States now appeals. We 
do not meet the question of negligence because we hold 
that the court erred in not applying the discretionary 
function exception. Accordingly, we will reverse. 
 
II. 
 
In United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-323 
(1991), the Court provides a two-part inquiry to guide the 
application of the discretionary function exception. First, a 
court must determine whether the act involves an"element 
of judgment or choice." 499 U.S. at 322. "The requirement 
of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a `federal statute, 
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of 
action for an employee to follow . . . .' " Id. (quoting 
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)); see 
also Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
Second, even if the challenged conduct involves an 
element of judgment, the court must determine "whether 
that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function 
exception was designed to shield." Gaubert , 499 U.S. at 
322-323 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines , 467 U.S. 
797, 813 (1984)). The "focus of the inquiry is not on the 
agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion 
conferred by the statute, but on the nature of the actions 
taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy 
analysis." Id. at 325; see also Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 753; 
Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 892 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 
A. 
 
The government refers to the 1984 Park Road Standards 
as providing guidance to the Park Service. See  App. 67-74; 
Appellee's App. at 1-5. In particular, the Standards read: 
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       Road safety and efficiency of operation depend on 
       adequate levels of cyclic and preventative maintenance 
       and repair, which are also essential to protect the 
       Service's extensive capital investment in the physical 
       facility constituted by park roads, parkways and 
       bridges. Consequently, park roads shall be maintained 
       to the standards to which they have been constructed 
       or reconstructed, and in a condition that promotes 
       safety and protects capital investment. 
 
Appellee's App. at 3. The Standards "provideflexibility in 
the planning and design processes to allow for 
consideration of variations in types and intensities of park 
use, for wide differences in terrain and climatic conditions, 
and for protection of natural and cultural resources in 
National Park System areas." App. at 69. Furthermore, 
"[b]ecause of the resources preserved in the Federal land 
management areas, and the type of tourist use in such 
areas, the roads in certain instances do not have to be 
constructed to normal highway standards." App. at 69. 
 
Under these guidelines, the Park Service's decision about 
how and when to reconstruct Route 209 would seem to be 
a discretionary decision implicating a number of policy 
considerations. When the Park Service took over Route 209 
from the Commonwealth, there were numerous aspects of 
the road's design, condition and safety that called for the 
Park Service's attention. The Service was forced to prioritize 
among these projects because of its restricted budget and 
its limited ability to make repairs. 
 
Because the Park Service legitimately exercised discretion 
in determining the priority of road repairs and redesigns, 
this court must determine whether its exercise of discretion 
was of the type the exception was intended to shield. 
 
B. 
 
In making such decisions, the government must weigh 
social, economic and political policy. The Park Service was 
required to balance its mission of preserving the parklands 
against the severity of design flaws and the different levels 
of deterioration of the road as it was received from the 
Commonwealth. The Service's choice to focus on a few 
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highly dangerous portions of the road rather than to 
distribute its finite resources along the whole of Route 209 
is a policy choice this court should not second-guess. 
 
The developing jurisprudence setting forth boundaries of 
the exercise of agency discretion has begun to present 
certain guidelines. At one extreme, some courts have held 
that the agency decision went beyond the ambit of 
appropriate discretion when the agency ignored blatant 
safety hazards that could have been repaired through 
routine periodic maintenance mandated by explicit policy. 
In ARA Leisure Services v. United States, 831 F.2d 193 (9th 
Cir. 1987), a tour bus went off the road and rolled over a 
mountain pass in Denali Park, Alaska. Evidence showed 
that the National Park Service had permitted a road,"which 
had edges so soft as to be dangerous," to erode from an 
original width of 28 feet to 14.6 feet at the accident site. 
831 F.2d at 195. Citing Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 
688, 693 (8th Cir. 1986), the court explained that the 
discretionary function exception does not apply"[w]here the 
challenged governmental activity involves safety 
considerations under an established policy rather than the 
balancing of competing public policy considerations." ARA 
Leisure Serv., 831 F.2d at 195. Applying the same rationale, 
we held the Navy did not function within the ambit of 
statutory agency discretion when it failed to provide a 
handrail while requiring an employee to negotiate a steep 
unlighted 20-feet long path where there was evidence that 
two or three years before the accident the Navy had been 
asked to install a handrail. Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 
176, 181 (3d Cir. 1997). This court reasoned that the Navy 
was not entitled to the protection of the discretionary 
function exception because the government failed to 
articulate a public policy rationale--military, social or 
economic consideration--that factored into its decision not 
to rebuild the stairway or install a handrail. See id. at 181- 
182; see also Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 757 (holding that 
because the National Park Service failed to show how 
providing some lighting, but not more, is grounded in policy 
objectives it was not protected by the discretionary function 
exception). We rejected the government's attempt to 
characterize the decision not to take action as one of 
national security: "This case is not about a national 
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security concern, but rather a mundane, administrative, 
garden-variety, housekeeping problem that is about as far 
removed from the policies applicable to the Navy's mission 
as it is possible to get." Id. at 181. 
 
Similarly, one of our sister circuits reached the 
conclusion that a failure to repair can fall under the 
discretionary function exception if it is based on a public 
policy rationale. The court in Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445 
(D.C. Cir. 1995), determined that the Park Service's 
decision not to repave a particularly slippery stretch of the 
Rock Creek Parkway was protected. Id. at 451. The court 
reasoned that "[d]etermining the appropriate course of 
action would require balancing factors such as Beach 
Drive's overall purpose, the allocation of funds among 
significant project demands, the safety of drivers and other 
park visitors, and the inconvenience of repairs as compared 
to the risk of safety hazards." Id.; see also Baum v. United 
States, 986 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The decision of 
how and when to replace a major element of a substantial 
public facility is . . . at bottom a question of how best to 
allocate resources."). 
 
III. 
 
From case law, it becomes apparent that in applying the 
teachings of Gaubert, the inquiry becomes fact-specific. 
 
A. 
 
It bears emphasis in this case that the Park Service 
inherited Route 209 from Pennsylvania in 1983. The record 
indicates that a study conducted shortly thereafter revealed 
numerous design and safety issues. A number of bridges 
were in need of repair or reconstruction due to structural 
deficiencies, insufficient width and load limitations. One 
bridge in particular was rapidly deteriorating. In addition, 
the report found that "on nearly all road sections in the 
park" there were obstructions within the desirable clear 
zone, including "[c]oncrete posts, telephone poles, culvert 
head-walls, and trees," some "within a foot or two of the 
edge of the pavement." App. at 154. Finally, the study 
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indicated that most of the roads in the park would need to 
be resurfaced within the next ten years. 
 
In determining whether to commit funds for a complete 
reconstruction of Route 209, the government had to 
consider the ultimate purpose of the road, whether it would 
continue as a major commercial through-road or whether 
its use would be scaled back to serve principally as a 
recreational road. The Park Service decided that it was 
desirable to turn Route 209 into a "scenic parkway[ ] such 
as Skyline Drive in Shenandoah National Park and Blue 
Ridge Parkway." App. at 65. Congress closed the road first 
to some and later to all non-park-related commercial traffic, 
and it allocated monies toward the construction of a bypass 
that would serve as an alternative to Route 209. However, 
Congress did not allocate funds for the complete 
reconstruction of the road itself. 
 
In light of these larger policy decisions, the Park Service 
was forced to determine priorities among the desirable 
improvements to the recently ceded Route 209. Major 
structural deficiencies, such as the rapidly deteriorating 
bridge, understandably were "priority 1 work." App. at 154. 
Among the roadside obstructions that were present all 
along the park's roads, the Park Service report noted that 
those within one or two feet of the road were of particular 
concern. 
 
B. 
 
Unlike the roadway in ARA Leisure Services or the steep 
hillside lacking a guardrail in Gotha, the complaint here 
concerns a concrete culvert head-wall that was five feet 
west of the paved roadway. This embankment would only 
become dangerous to an operator of a vehicle when two 
conditions are present: (1) the operator proceeded 
northbound on a southbound lane, and (2) the operator 
drove the vehicle five feet off the road in the wrong 
direction. The Park Service had to balance the costs of the 
repairs of every culvert head-wall along Route 209, along 
with the other safety issues identified in the 1986 study, 
against the low risk of an accident. See App. at 65 (from 
1989 to 1993 no accidents, other than Mitchell's, were 
attributed to the Eshback area of Route 209). 
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Under these circumstances we conclude that the 
Service's decision to determine its repair and design 
priorities came within the discretionary function exception 
to the FTCA. Unlike Gotha, the Park Service has articulated 
several policy considerations that are implicated in the Park 
Service's decision not to undertake a reconstruction of all 
drainage ditches along Route 209. This case, therefore, falls 
in line with the major policy decisions at stake in Cope and 
not the "mundane, administrative, garden-variety, 
housekeeping problem" presented in Gotha, 115 F.3d at 
181. 
 
* * * * * 
 
We have considered all other contentions raised by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. We hold that the discretionary function 
exception applies to the Park Service's decision not to 
repair or redesign the concrete culvert head-wall and thus 
the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a 
suit against the Service. The judgment of the district court 
will be reversed and the proceedings remanded to the 
district court with a direction to enter judgment in favor of 
the government. 
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